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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LIMITATION OF STATE
EMPLOYEES' SALARIES BY SECTION 246 OF THE
KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION
Suit' was instituted in the Circuit Court of Franklin
County, Kentucky, to determine whether or not the executives
and professors of the University of Kentucky and the State
Teachers' Colleges, certain attorneys engaged by the Commis-
sioner of Revenue to work on a commission basis, and a techni-
cal adviser to the Public Service Commission, were within the
operation of Section 246 of the state constitution, which reads
as follows:
"No public officer, except the Governor, shall receive more
than five thousand dollars per annum, as compensation for
official services, independent of the compensation of legally
authorized deputies and assistants, which shall be fixed and pro-
vided for by law. The General Assembly shall provide for the
enforcement of this section by suitable penalties, one of which
shall be forfeiture of office by any person violating its pro-
visions."
It was held in the circuit court that all of those in ques-
tion were employees of the state and were not public officers
within the meaning of the provision and were not subject to
the limitation. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky, it was held that the attorneys engaged on a commission
basis and the technical adviser to the Public Service Commission
were independent contractors and so were not within the scope
of the constitutional provision. But the provision was held to
apply to all employees and not merely to state officers exercis-
ing official duties. Therefore the executives and professors of
the University of Kentucky and the State Teachers' Colleges
were included therein.
'Talbott, Commissioner of Finance v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 291 Ky. 109, 163 S. W. (2d) 33 (1942). This action was insti-
tuted by the Public Service Commission against J. Dan Talbott, the
Commissioner of Finance, to secure a declaration of rights on a con-
tract between Hugh B. Bearden and the Public Service Commission.
Bearden was employed by the Public Service Commission as a
technical adviser. Talbott filed an answer and a cross petition nam-
ing the attorneys and the executives and professors of the colleges
as defendants.
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Because it did not seem reasonable to the Court that the
framers of the constitution intended to put a limit on the
salaries of state officials and at the same time to allow em-
ployees or subordinates to receive salaries which might be
bestowed upon them, without limitation in amount, it was held
that the word "officer" included, by inference, all employees.
The President and professors of the University and of the
State Teachers' Colleges thus were held to be employees but
subject to the salary limitation. It was admitted that they
were not public officers, since, among other reasons, no portion
of the sovereign power was bestowed upon them by the legisla-
ture, nor were they occupying any office created by the
hgislature, and they were not required to take an official oath.
In a forceful dissenting opinion Judge Rees challenged the
propriety of the Court to read the word employees into the
provision. This is substantially the position that will be taken
by the following discussion.
In holding that the technical adviser and the attorneys
were not to be included in the provision, the Court called them
independent contractors. The term "independent contractor"
is usually sig-nificant in connection with negligence cases where
a question of master and servant relationship is involved. But
here the Court used the term to distinguish between those who
were to be included in the provision and those who were not.
In a broad sense, one test whether or not one is an inde-
pendent contractor is the control exercised over him by the
employer. It was said that since the Public Service Com-
mission, in this ease, was not sufficiently familiar with its
technical adviser's work to 'exercise any direction and control,
the adviser was, therefore, an independent contractor. The
attorneys in question were also said to be independent con-
tractors, because their work was not subject to the direction of
the Commissioner of Revenue or any other state official. This,
however, presents a problem in regard to the presidents and
executives of the State University and the Teachers' Colleges.
They were said by the Court not to be independent contractors.
And one may admit that in certain things such as methods and
intervals of pay, their employment differs from that of the
attorneys. But their work is no more subject to detailed
supervision than is the work of the so-called independent con-
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tractors. They are experts whose competency reaches beyond
the direction of their employers-the boards of trustees.
Moreover, it is not clear that a distinction between em-
ployees and independent contractors was intended by the
constitution. There is certainly nothing in the provision to
indicate this. If such a distinction were intended, it would be
very difficult to determine to whom it should apply.
Another difficult problem, and one which may be so de-
termined as to render a lengthy discussion of independent
contractors unnecessary, is presented by the construction of
the salary limit provision to include all subordinate employees.
It is the purpose of this discussion to examine whether or not
the soundest principles of constitutional law were followed in
so interpreting it.
The object of construction, as applied to a written instru-
ment, is to determine the intent of the people who framed it.
In the words of Judge Cooley:
"... this intent is to be found in the instrument itself. It is to
be presumed that the language has been employed with sufficient
precision to convey it, and unless examination demonstrates
that the presumption does not hold good in the particular case,
,nothing will remain except to enforce it."'
It is well settled that if the language used is clear and
unambiguous, the courts have no right to go further than the
words themselves in determining the intent of the framers. .3
Indeed, we may go so far as to say that the courts should never
resort to extraneous aids in construction unless the words are
ambiguous or lead to an apparent absurdity which would be
clearly contrary to the intent of the people who framed them.
In the case we are considering the Court resorted to certain
extraneous aids in construction. Thus, it reviewed the pro-
ceedings of the constitutional convention and observed that
section 246 was inserted as an amendment to the earlier draft.
It also considered the evils which, presumably, were intended
to be prevented thereby. The question here raised is whether
or not the provision was ambiguous or for other reasons
necessitated a resort to extraneous aids in construction.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) p. 89.
SCarter et al v. Cain et al, 179 Ark. 79, 14 S. W. (2d) 250 (1929).
See Fairchild v. Foster. 25 Ar-z 146, - , 214 Pa'. . 19, 321 (199.9);
Boswell v. State, 181 Okla. 435, - , 74 P. (2d) 940, 942 (1937);
BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (2d ed. 1911) sec. 8, cf. secs. 24-27.
STUDENT NoTm
If the literal interpretation of a written instrument results
in an absurdity or contradiction ond is contrary to the intention
of the people who framed it, the courts will endeavor to give
it a more liberal construction.4  The Court attached great im-
portance to the argument that the framers of the constitution
could not have intended to put a limit on salaries of officials
while mere subordinates or employees under them might re-
ceive any salary which someone might think proper to pay them..
This was deemed an absurdity and contrary, therefore, to the
intent of the framers.
It may well be questioned whether or not it is absurd that
this provision should apply to officers and not to employees.
But even if it be regarded as absurd, it may not be said that
a clear and unambiguous constitutional provision does not
express the intent of the framers merely because it works a
hardship or an absurdity.5 If the provision in question here
is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason to infer that the
framers intended something which they did not say. It must
be obvious that the language used does not express the intention
of the framers. It is not enough that it appears to work an
absurdity or hardship.
If we examine the provision again, it will be noticed that
the language used is this: "No public officer except the
governor, shall receive more than five thousand dollars per
annum, as compensation for official services . . . W " V*hat
the Court said was that the framers meant to include employees
as well as officers in this provision. Attention should be drawn
to the words "compensation for official services" which follow.
It would seem that only those who performed official services
were meant to be included.
In holding certain of the parties to be independent con-
tractors, the Court indirectly recognized a distinction between
those persons enjoying contractual relations with the State
and those holding official positions. The latter do not receive
salaries because of a contract but because of their office. It is
'See Bakkenson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 197
Cal. 504, 241 Pac. 874, 877 (1925); Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327,
123 N. E. 566, 567 (1919); State v. Joseph, 143 La. 428, 78 So. 663,
664 (1918).
r State ex rel. Turner v. Patch et al, 64 Mont. 565, 210 Pac. 748(1922); 16 C. J., Constitutional Law (1918) sec. 18.
0 Supra note 1.
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probably against the latter that this provision was especially
directed. State employees and surely those in question have
contractual relations with the State. Should the provision, then,
be held to apply to them?
The framers of the constitution and the people who adopted
it are presumed to have been people of average intelligence.
If they had meant to include employees within the provision
in question, would they not have done so by the simple ex-
pedient of adding that word ? In the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, concerning the Federal Constitution, in Gibbons v.
Ogden,7 they [the people]" . . . must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense and to have intended
what they have said." Further forfeiture of office, the only
penalty prescribed, cannot apply to employees.
It is a dangerous policy to go outside the wording of a
constitutional provision and to insert language which does not
appear therein. Such construction should be avoided wherever
possible. A safer result, and one more in accordance with
sound principles of construction, would probably have been
reached in this case if the provision had been applied as it read.
WmLIAm H. FULTON, JR.
7See 9 Wheat, 1, 188, 6. L. Ed. p. 23, 186 (U. S. 1824), quoted in
Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court,
273 Ky. 674, 117 S. W. (2d) 918 at 923 (1938).
